EverHarden establishes, enforces, and continuously verifies a deterministic security boundary around the actions an AI agent is authorized to take. Every refund, payout-record change, or outbound message is designed to route through one chokepoint — checked against typed facts (amount > limit, approval_verified == false), never the agent's words — and we prove the set is complete before you rely on it.
Everyone is shipping prompt-injection detectors. But a detector that's 99% accurate still flips the attacker's coin — a few hundred free retries and one payload gets through. You cannot win a retry war with a filter, and the filters are commoditizing into the cloud platforms' free tiers anyway.
So stop trying to keep the agent un-fooled. Assume it will be fooled — then put a deterministic gate in front of the action it would take. The gate never reads the agent's words, so there is nothing to jailbreak. A perfect prompt injection buys the attacker nothing.
The metric that matters isn't how many agents you've deployed — it's how much consequential authority each one has. That's showing up everywhere adoption gets real:
The security question isn't whether the model can be manipulated — assume it can. The question is whether manipulation can produce a consequential action.
In late 2025, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 found indirect prompt injection actively weaponized across the public web — 22 distinct techniques on real sites, hijacking AI agents into triggering Stripe payments, deleting databases, and approving scam ads. One scam page stacked 24 separate injection attempts.
Notice what the damage actually was: not "the agent read a bad sentence" — a payment moved, a record was destroyed. That's an action. Guard the action and the injection is inert, no matter how clever the sentence that triggered it.
A jailbreak wins by changing what the agent believes. None of these three can be moved by anything the agent believes, says, or is told.
Every rule is a pure function of structured facts — amount_cents > limit, approval_verified == false, payout_changed_recently. There is no natural-language understanding to fool, so a perfect jailbreak buys nothing.
The guarantee is completeness: no consequential action reaches the outside world except through the gate. A documented chokepoint contract plus a CI drift-check fails the build the day a new tool slips a side door.
Default mode logs the decision it would make and lets the action proceed — into a hash-chained, tamper-evident evidence log. You see exactly what it would have stopped on your real traffic before you let it stop anything.
The live demo runs the real engine in your browser — no server, no model. Pick a scripted attack (refund abuse, payout laundering) or build your own action and type the most persuasive jailbreak you can. The verdict won't move, because the gate never reads your words. There's also a one-click chokepoint check: paste your agent's tool list and see which actions would be gated and which are side doors.
A detector asks "is this input malicious?" — an infinite question, and the attacker gets unlimited tries. The gate asks "is this action allowed?" — a finite, typed one. Finite is ownable.
Detection and containment aren't competitors — a detector that quietly drops obvious junk is fine. But it can't be the thing standing between a compromised agent and your money. For that you need a wall that doesn't negotiate, and a wall that doesn't read can't be talked around.
Anyone can write a refund-limit rule, and the incumbents will. What's hard — and what compounds — is proving that every consequential action routes through the gate, with no side door, and keeping it that way as the agent gains tools. That proof is the product.
A documented contract lists every gated action, and a CI check fails the build the day a tool is added without a gated path. Coverage can't silently rot — a guarantee you can't quietly break is one you can actually sell.
Before the guarantee applies, we enumerate every tool your agent has and prove there's no ungated path. If it has a raw shell or arbitrary query, the chokepoint can't be complete — and we say so, instead of selling you a wall with a door in it.
Two tiers. The first earns the meeting; the second proves it on your own traffic. Nothing gets blocked until you've seen what would have been blocked.
The real engine, in your browser, against a mock agent. It shows the mechanism is deterministic — a jailbroken agent gets the same answer as a fooled one. Open it →
We wire the gate in front of your real agent in shadow mode for 10–14 days. It blocks nothing; you keep the evidence report — "here's the catastrophic thing we'd have stopped." See the pilot checklist →
Ghost is EverHarden's adversarial verification engine. It doesn't attack the gate's rule logic — a cleverer sentence buys nothing there, by construction. It attacks everywhere the risk actually is: execution primitives with no gated path, facts secretly derived from agent output, tool pairs that compose into a bypass, and policy coverage gaps.
Every run generates a new, differently-worded social-engineering attempt via Claude, then evaluates the same fixed facts through the real deterministic gate. Run it →
Submit your tool list, policy rules, and fact-provenance contract. Ghost runs six deterministic checks — no LLM in this path — and returns a hash-chained findings report. See what's included →
If the worst thing your agent can do is give a wrong answer, you don't need this. If it can change money, records, code, or customers, the boundary around that authority is the thing worth securing.
Can it modify a repository, trigger a deploy, or run infrastructure commands? That's the consequential surface — not "does it write good code."
One action that updates CRM, billing, and a project record at once means one boundary has to cover all three, correctly, every time.
Refunds, account changes, and record updates are exactly the actions a social-engineering attempt is built to trigger.
Auto-remediation is powerful precisely because it acts without asking — which is also exactly why its scope needs a hard edge.
Moving or authorizing money is the highest-stakes consequential action most companies have an agent touch at all.
The boundary that's complete today can quietly stop being complete the day a new tool ships. Coverage has to keep up, not just start out true.
Agent gateways, IAM, policy engines, cloud controls, and runtime security platforms already exist, and EverHarden is built to integrate with them, not require ripping them out. The wedge isn't the rule — anyone can write a refund-limit check. It's independent, action-level verification that consequential authority stays inside that boundary, and stays inside it as the agent gains tools.
We don't harden the agent or stop every jailbreak — we assume the agent will be fooled. We guard a finite, typed set of consequential actions, completely, and we prove the set is complete.
We don't guard actions you don't route through the gate. If your agent has a raw shell or an arbitrary query tool, the chokepoint can't be complete — and we'll tell you that before we sell you anything.
For everything else, you need other tools. We'll tell you which ones.
Two weeks, blocks nothing, and you keep the evidence report either way. If it never would have stopped anything, you've lost nothing but the wiring time. This doesn't eliminate all AI risk — it controls and proves consequential action authority, specifically.